MSC Napoli Sinking

[marapito]

Photographs at http://www.skipsfarts-forum.net/read.php?TID=3361&page=1
 clearly indicate hogging (a broken back) at the time the crew were rescued.

This ship was apparently the first post panamax container vessel.  At 898 x 120 feet and 81,841 tons [D.W.T], would she be the second largest vessel ever to be lost by disaster - since the Seawise University [ex Queen Elizabeth] burnt at Hong Kong?

[Royston Ford]

still maintain Cherbourg would have been the best bet

You may well be right, Gareth, which raises an interesting question. SOSREP (presently Robin Middleton) has absolute jurisidiction to take and implement any decision concerning a casualty in UK waters. I really think this incident has so far been a complete vindication of the government's creation of that post. Can you imagine if his decisions had to be approved by every local authority or port captain that might be affected by the outcome...the "Prestige" all over again.

It begs the question, should we have an EU equivalent of SOSREP with powers that override national governments? Maybe Cherbourg would have been the best option, but can you imagine the French agreeing to it?

Hmmm? I wonder...

[FWE]

I agree and it will be interesting to learn if Cherbourg was asked and if so the response.

[Stuart Scott]

I'm interested in the location of the structural failure, at the break of the accommodation and engineroom. Container vessels are not highly stressed vessels - sumultaneous discharge and reloading of cells and bays don't put the same stresses into the hull as say a bulk carrier.

Assuming she has heated bunker tanks (or a void space) in the area of the failure, I'm speculating is that the shell plating has corroded/thinned here. I had recent experience with a tanker I was managing going through 3rd Special Survey ultrasonic thickness, and significant steel diminution found in the hull shell plating and deck around enginerom side bunker tanks.

Void spaces around the engineroom are hot, hunid and not easy to inspect. I'm not taking a shot at MSC, Zodiac or Class. Its just a reality that internal breakdown of coatings and corrosion is far more insidious than external corrosion.

I'm sure Class and the MCA will be taking sections of the hull plating in way of the crack as soon as the bunkers have been removed.

[maz_atenza]

2 video

http://normandie.france3.fr/info/27626902-fr.php

[maz_atenza]

anyone seen new pictures from today?

[maz_atenza]

article from 2001

MA CGM NORMANDIE (France)
London, Mar 30

[Stuart Scott]

I have attached a link to the Gallery of Transport Loss (hosted by Countryman and McDaniel, USA). They have put up a feature on the 'MSC Napoli' from initial flooding to today, and update the site daily.

http://www.cargolaw.com/2007nightmare_msc.napoli.html

Enjoy...

[maz_atenza]

The MCA said it could be a year before the vessel and its contents were removed.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/6295907.stm

[Charles McAllister]

sscott,

You make a good point.  Internal corrosion can be a major problem, aggravated by the fact that inspection is difficult.  I did some work on Mansol 19, a trawler converted to ROV support, in Malta in 1998.  I was told the conversion took twice as long as planned because the 2nd surveyor entered all tanks and discovered hull plating that had corroded severely.  Quite a lot of plating had to be replaced. Externally, all looked good, but part of the hull had been badly weakened by internal corrosion.

[rgr004]

HFO Bunker are usually found in double bottom tanks, not in side tanks, which on container ships are usually dedicated for ballast water.

Trust class surveyors use electronic devices to measure steel thickness.

Someone has mentioned that containship hulls are not highly stressed, well I am not sure about this comment. When stowage plans are provided to vessel, chief officer job is to check for torsion, bending, shearing moments, stack loads, etc, in the vessel computer program.

Roland

[spotti]

Stressed containership hulls.
The hull section behind the superstructure of this type of containerships must be subject to a considerable stress factor due to the limited buoyancy. Even if all containers loaded here would be empties each 40 feet container adds
approx. 4 tons. Add to this the constant change in hull
buoyancy when the ship is working in heavy swells/high waves. Plus/minus buoyancy of this hull section under such conditions could be (only guesswork)100-200 tons, - 2-4 times each minute.
Any professionals around who would like to elaborate on this issue?
Could be interesting to have a look at the loading plan for the aft section of the ship.

[rgr004]

Spotti,

Nowadays design for new buildings includes calculation of static and dynamic loads, same goes for stress on lashing gears with loadstar programs or similar.

Roland

[bm1]

I cant think of any other ships of this kind whjere the back has just broklen like this.   the msc carla was a very different case because the extra modules added and the suggestion the welding should have been checkd better. the msc napoli had no sister ship so its diffitcult to tell fi thjs was a design fault with this one ship oir something that woudl affect other boxships. there has beena lot of talk about fatigue but i for one would like to here of any other ships of this size which ahve just broken apart. it was only a scale 9 storm and she should have survived no problems. was it rust at the back or a bad repair. does anyone actuakkly know if the accient in 2001 could really have caused any real damage that was not repaired and made the ship more likely to crack. the damage was at the front and the new crack at the back but coiuld the structure of the ship been damaged.

[FWE]

It appears from the interesting contributions above that is unlikely that any one factor is to blame but a combination of weather, speed, loading, fatigue, earlier repairs which will need to be investigated at a subsequent enquiry for which various records need to be secured.

The handling of the incident also needs to be assessed later as to whether Cherbourg were asked to take the ship, and whether the receiver of wrecks could have secured the area, and if containers left on board should be further secured to prevent loss in further storms, if those lost adequately tracked to prevent them becoming a hazard to navigation etc.... This story appears only at the first chapter and is likely to run long after the wreck is cleared.